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This is an author’s version of a chapter published in Philosophical issues in Psychiatry II: 


















In this chapter I seek both to ask whether psychiatric classification is a good thing, and also to 
make it clear how this is an issue on which reasonable people can disagree. When I’m talking of 
“classification” I have in mind the type of classification facilitated by diagnostic systems such as 
the DSM.  
 
We can question the wisdom of classifying mentally ill people either in general or in particular 
cases.  At the general level, we might ask whether research programmes such as that associated 
with the DSM are a force for good or evil. At the particular level, we may query the role of 
classification in some particular sub-domain, currently, for example, personality disorders stand 
out as a particularly contested area. Questions at the two levels are of course linked. Those who 
are generally skeptical about psychiatric classification will worry about classification in many 
particular cases. Writers such as Thomas Szsaz (1974), for example, would accept only 
classifications of organic brain disorders as legitimate. At the other end of the scale, even those 
who are generally pro-classification will agree that some areas of human behavior should not be 
included in the DSM, for example, they might worry about the potential medicalisation of 
normal grief (Horwitz and Wakefield 2007),  
 
As tends to be the case with philosophical discussion, much of my argument will be at a fairly 
abstract level and will be couched in general terms – I shall consider why, in general, 
classification can be helpful, and what, in general, are the risks attached to classification. 
However, applying the discussion to particular cases is straightforward, and I shall also mention 
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particular cases as the chapter proceeds. My overall claim will be that classification in psychiatry 
is frequently, but not always, a good thing. The chapter is split into three main sections. The first 
considers the benefits of classification, the second considers the harms that classification can 
produce, the third, and most tentative, section starts to consider how classificatory projects might 
best proceed in order to maximize the benefits and minimize the harms.   
 
1. The benefits of classification 
 
Classification can enable us to gain power over a domain. Where entities fall into groups that are 
genuinely similar to each other in theoretically important ways then classifying them into groups 
of like entities is a valuable part of scientific practice.  As entities that fall into such natural 
groups are similar they can be expected to behave similarly. What is all this talk of “genuinely 
similar”, “natural”, “theoretically important” doing? Basically I just want to emphasise that in 
order for classification to yield power over a domain the similarities have to be significant and 
out there in the world. The classification that I'm interested in is of the sort that has been used to 
such great advantage in chemistry and the biological sciences. All samples of an element have 
the same atomic number, and this ensures that their properties are alike.  All members of a 
species are genetically similar and have similar developmental histories; as such they can be 





Those who favour classification frequently talk of “natural kinds”. Members of a natural kind are 
alike, and natural laws mean that members of a kind will behave similarly. Depending on the 
author, other conditions have also been added. Natural kinds have been claimed to be universal 
(in the sense of occurring everywhere), discrete, to have essential properties, and so on and so 
forth (see, for example, the conditions imposed by Haslam 2003, Zachar 2001). In earlier work I 
talked in terms of natural kinds, and claimed that at least some mental disorders can be 
considered natural kinds (Cooper 2005). One of the problems I encountered is that the term 
“natural kind” has become encrusted with metaphysical baggage. When I talked about “natural 
kinds”, intending to use the term with minimal commitments, I was heard as being committed to 
all sorts of things. 
 
Now instead of talking of natural kinds I will talk of “repeatables”. This makes clear the basic 
important idea; some entities in the world are alike, and will behave in similar ways. As applied 
to mental disorders, the idea that there may be repeatables is this: if we consider individual cases 
of mental disorder some can be seen to be similar to each other. Furthermore some of these 
similarities will be theoretically important, and in some cases patients who are grouped together 
will be alike in fundamental ways (maybe they all have the same genetic abnormality, or all have 
similar levels of some neurotransmitter, or all have similar relationships with their childhood 
caregivers).  If we take cases of mental disorder as our domain and plot them onto a 




If we focus on the right properties, then the clusters that such a process generates will be 
inductively powerful. External validation on the basis of treatment response, family history, 
demographic correlates and so on can give additional reason to believe that patients who are 
being classified together are similar in genuinely important respects. If all goes well, a case that 
falls in a particular cluster can be expected to behave in ways that are similar to others of its 
class. The importance of such similarities is obvious if one thinks of treatments. The hope would 
be that a treatment that is found to work for one member of a class will work for others in that 
class too. 
 
Note that the key question in looking for repeatables is whether cases of a mental disorder are 
importantly similar to each other. The question of whether varieties of mental disorder will turn 
out to be discrete or continuous turns out to be a side-issue. It is the fact that there are similarities 
between entities that does all the work when it comes to making inductive inferences and 
grounding explanations. It is because “repeatables” all have similar properties that one will 
behave like the others of its type. Thus, classifications that vary along dimensions can be as 
powerful as those that rely on discrete categories. Think of alloys as an example. Knowing that a 
sample is a particular alloy is as useful, and useful in the same kinds of ways, as knowing that it 
is a 100% pure metal (if a sample is known to be 55% zinc and 45% copper, one can predict how 
the sample will behave just as well as if one knew it to be pure copper). There is reason to think 
that at least some mental disorders will be better mapped by a continuous rather than a 
categorical classification system. Draft versions of the DSM-V suggest that classifications of 




The idea that mental disorders are repeatables is a very weak claim. It says simply that cases of 
disorder can be grouped together on the basis of important similarities, and that cases that are 
grouped together can then be expected to behave in similar ways. One potential worry is that we 
might be able to pick out many, but inconsistent, potentially useful classifications. In his 1990 
paper “Toward a scientific psychiatric nosology” Ken Kendler suggests that this might turn out 
to be the case with some mental disorders. Kendler takes the case of schizophrenia, and discusses 
evidence that the criteria that pick out subtypes that best predict treatment response may be 
different from those that best fit with familial aggregation.   
 
Similar situations occur elsewhere in science, and occur because the world is messy and 
complex. Within biology, species can be delimited on multiple different criteria. Evolutionary 
theorists  are chiefly interested in groups of organisms based on common descent. Ecologists are 
more interested in classifying on the basis of current behavior. Thinking about such cases, the 
philosopher John Dupré urges us to be realists, but “promiscuous realists” (Dupré 1981, 1990, 
2001). His thought is that multiple different classification systems can be picked out, with 
different classification systems being most suitable for different purposes. Thinking in terms of a 
multidimensional quality space, on Dupré’s picture we can discern different groupings if we 
focus in at different levels of resolution or restrict our attention to particular dimensions of the 
space. Dupré’s suggestion is that we should let a thousand flowers bloom, and that each 




Returning to psychiatry, a promiscuous realist would suggest that if, for example, it is the case 
that one set of criteria best predicts treatment outcome while another set best predicts how 
disorders run in families then researchers interested in different questions should use different 
criteria. Though Dupré tends to emphasise the advantages of embracing multiplicity, it should be 
noted that there is also a downside. If different researchers use different sets of criteria for 
different sorts of research, then seeking to combine their findings to make an overall judgment 
becomes problematic. Suppose that those working on schizophrenia did start to use multiple 
different sets of criteria. In effect, those interested in treatment would be talking about slightly 
different entities when they talked of “subtypes of schizophrenia” than would those looking at 
patterns of inheritance. As a consequence, “translation” would be required in those cases where 
data from both sorts of studies was required together. Recognising multiple sets of repeatables 
will thus not be cost free and may not always be worthwhile. Still the key point can be upheld – 
the existence of competing classifications is compatible with a domain consisting of repeatables.  
 
To summarise this section: classification will be useful in so far as mental disorders turn out to 
be repeatables, in the sense that all cases of a type of disorder are fundamentally similar. We 
should hope that mental disorders do turn out to be repeatables, as only with repeatability will it 





2. The Dangers of Classification 
 
And yet, a major tradition sees something problematic about classifying human beings. A sign 
outside the counsellors' office at my university depicts tins of food and reads “Labels are for tins. 
Not people” in the same sort of tone that other posters warn of the evils of racism or domestic 
violence. One infers that labelling people is not a nice thing to do. The idea that classifying 
people is at least a little bit evil can also be found in the work of many of those who are opposed 
to 'the medical model” (as found in antipsychiatry, critical psychiatry, postpsychiatry). 
 
Diagnostic labels may cause harm in various ways. For example, in some cases, labels harm 
individuals by facilitating prejudice against them. Thus racial labels played a role in enabling the 
system of apartheid practiced in South Africa. Clearly labels can also harm through inaccurately 
reflecting the structure of reality. For example, when a classification system mistakenly lumps 
together disorders that are really distinct this may result in patients receiving sub-optimal 
treatments. Though important, there is little of philosophical interest to say about such harms. In 
this section I focus on a different and philosophically under-investigated variety of harm. These 
harms arise because diagnostic labels can enter the narratives by which people make sense of 
their lives and thereby limit the meaningful futures that a person can imagine.  In discussing 
these harms I will draw on Alastair MacIntyre’s (1981) ideas about the importance of narrative 
for human flourishing, Ian Hacking’s (1995) work on the looping effects that affect human kinds 




Narratives are important for human flourishing. In recent years this claim has become a 
commonplace in both philosophy and medicine (MacIntyre 1981, Elliott 1999).  Some go so far 
as to link the narratives that a person tells about themselves with a person’s identity (MacIntyre 
1981). I don't want to align myself with such radical views here, but I do think that the narratives 
that structure people’s lives are important. At the very least such narratives help to shape what an 
individual thinks they might do and how they come to understand how they have acted in the 
past.  
 
Both illness itself and the act of diagnosis can threaten our ability to narrate our lives. The fact 
that illness can compromise our narrative abilities, for example through distracting us with pain, 
or by destroying our memory, should be underlined. I don't want to give the impression that I 
think it is only the talk of doctors rather than also the problems of bodies and minds that cause 
difficulties for narrative agency. Here though I shall focus on the problems that the act of 
diagnosis can itself produce.  
 
The nub of the problem is this: we structure our lives with the help of narratives, but we are not 
the sole authors of our life stories. Others too play a role in shaping what we can sensibly say 
about ourselves. Some co-authoring occurs by negotiation, but some situations place us in a 
position similar to that of someone playing the “continue-the-story” game played by children.  In 
the children's game someone writes the first few sentences of a story, they pass it on to the next 
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player who adds a passage, who passes it on to a third, and so on. The challenge is to continue 
the story in a way that makes sense given what one's co-authors have said. 
 
The interactions between a patient and a mental health professional as a diagnosis is made can be 
thought of in a similar vein. When a patient goes to a professional they tell them part of the story, 
the professional, in making a diagnosis, adds to it, and the patient is left to continue. Sometimes 
the effect of being diagnosed may be minimal, and arguably diagnosis may enable someone to 
practice reasonable planning and thus gain control over their life. Suppose I come to think of 
myself as having depressive tendencies. This may structure my actions in certain ways. Maybe I 
avoid drugs that have been found to trigger depression in those who are susceptible. Such actions 
may be reasonable and helpful for me.  
 
However certain diagnoses are more problematic. Certain diagnoses will imply that one's 
assessment of reality is not reliable (schizophrenia), or that one is essentially manipulative 
(Borderline Personality Disorder), or that one can never be trusted around children (paedophilia). 
Once one accepts such a diagnosis as accurate, telling a good story about one’s life will become 
difficult. By telling a “good story” I mean both telling a story with narrative coherence, plot etc.  
and also telling a story whereby one appears as a decent human being. Plausibly, people need to 
be able to tell stories about themselves that are good in both senses if they are to think well of 
themselves. To illustrate the problems that diagnoses can pose let’s consider Antisocial 
Personality Disorder. This is an extreme example, in so far as a diagnosis of ASPD will be one of 
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the toughest to incorporate into a good story about one’s life, however it will clearly illustrate the 
problems that diagnostic labels can pose.  
 
According to the DSM, ASPD is characterized by a number of undesirable character traits – 
aggressiveness, irresponsibility, deceptiveness, and so on. In short, someone with ASPD is a bad 
person. In addition, a powerful tradition has it that that personality disorders are lifelong states 
that can be highly resistant to treatment. That is someone with ASPD is an irrecoverably bad 
person. Suppose one receives a diagnosis of ASPD. What does one do then? As I found it hard to 
imagine how one might respond to receiving such a diagnosis I looked at posts on an online 
support group for people with ASPD (http://www.psychforums.com/antisocial-personality).  
There seemed to be three basic ways to respond to diagnosis. 
 
i. Challenge the diagnosis.  
Some refuse to believe the diagnosis. Either they give reasons for distrusting the individual 
clinician who diagnosed them, or they give reasons for thinking that all psychiatric diagnoses are 
unreliable. Given the esteem with which medicine is held in our culture, challenging a diagnosis 
will not always be a viable possibility. 
 
ii. “Embrace the dark-side”. 
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Some embrace the idea that they are evil. They have online names like “Lannibal Hector” and 
“Rage” and swap stories about torturing small animals and homeless people. Amongst such 
discussions the more sophisticated present themselves as being moral relativists, or think of 
themselves as Nietzschean supermen. The problem with this option is that it is morally 
unacceptable. Someone with ASPD who takes this option becomes worse than they were before. 
 
iii. Uncertainty 
Some people don't know how to respond to their diagnosis. They have found themselves 
diagnosed and then, in some cases, abandoned by mental health professionals, and don't have any 
idea what they should do now they have come to think of themselves as people with ASPD. 
 
Admittedly, the example of ASPD is an extreme one, and one might feel little sympathy for 
people who manifest the types of behaviours that tend to lead to them receiving such a diagnosis. 
Still the example of ASPD illustrates how the act of diagnosis can itself harm someone. Coming 
to believe that one is an untreatably bad person is difficult to live with.  
 
Of course physical diagnoses also limit the narratives that patients can sensibly tell about their 
lives. Most clearly this is the case with diagnoses of terminal illness. However diagnoses of 
mental disorder are perhaps particularly hard to incorporate into a good narrative about oneself, 
both because many mental disorders are chronic conditions, and also because in so far as mental 
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disorders affect personalities, emotions and beliefs they affect a person considered as an agent 
more directly than do many physical disorders. 
 
2. What to do? 
 
Classifying mental disorders can be hoped to bring great benefits. If mental disorders are 
repeatables, then once a correct classification scheme is achieved, diagnosis can be expected to 
predict how a case will behave. In particular, a treatment that works for some members of a class 
can be hoped to work for others. However, classifying people can also harm them. Harms may 
come about in various ways, but here I have focused on the ways in which diagnostic labels enter 
into the narratives by which people make sense of their lives and can limit the range of 
imaginable future courses of action. In this final section I begin to consider how classification 
systems might be developed so as to maximise their potential benefits and limit the associated 
risks. 
 
When considering the benefits and harms associated with classification, we can start by noting 
an unfortunate asymmetry. A classification system can only be expected to be useful if it is at 
least approximately correct, but it can harm people even if it is wrong. It's my belief that there is 




How should we act in such a situation? When hypotheses will harm whether they are right or 
wrong, but only do good if they are roughly correct, it would be wise to proceed with modesty 
and caution.  As we have seen by considering the case of ASPD, a classification system that 
makes the general claim “There are people of type X”, and a diagnostician who makes the 
particular claim “You are a person of type X” can do harm. Such labels can enter the narratives 
that people tell about themselves and limit the possible futures that they can imagine. In such 
situations it is better that the doubts that surround the validity of classes in a classification 
system, or an individual's diagnosis, are made explicit. Where there are doubts, a classification 
system that makes it explicit that there are competing classifications, and that the validity of a 
category is disputed, will do less damage.  How modest is the current DSM? Not very. The 
foreword to the DSM presents it as being a work in progress, but the language used in the main 
text suggests that the claims made in the DSM are definite truths rather than contested 
hypotheses. The harms produced by psychiatric classification could be reduced by making 
classifications such as the DSM more explicitly tentative. 
 
The harms that result from diagnosis can also be minimised by making hopeful illness narratives 
– where such exist – more accessible. In general, individuals model the stories that they tell 
about themselves on those that are readily available in their culture. Publicising examples of 
people who manage to tell good stories about themselves while living with condition X will thus 
make it more likely that those who are newly diagnosed with condition X will also come to be 
able to tell good stories about themselves. For example, in the past, telling a good life story that 
incorporated a diagnosis of schizophrenia was very difficult. In recent years it has become easier 
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In so far as it is knowledge of psychiatric labels that causes harm, one might wonder if things 
would be better if classification systems were developed and diagnoses made in secret.  Maybe 
the harms caused by psychiatric diagnosis occur because lay people and patients currently know 
too much, and a more secretive psychiatry would do less damage?  Such a suggestion should be 
rejected however. Within the human sciences, rigid distinctions between those who classify and 
those who are classified have been linked with a sorry history whereby classification has come to 
be biased against the less powerful (for studies of gender and psychiatry see Lunbeck 1994, on 
race see Fernando 2002, Cooper 2007 ch.8). The DSM itself has a history whereby categories 
have come to be included on dubious grounds – in the past, lobbying by special interest groups, 
and pressures from the insurance and pharmaceutical industries have played a role (Cooper 2005; 
Kutchins and Kirk 2003). It is plausible that more openness, rather than less, is needed to combat 
such tendencies (Longino 1990).  
 
A secret psychiatry is undesirable, however this doesn't mean that patients necessarily have to be 
told of their diagnosis. Consider the “don't ask, don't tell” policy adopted by many of those who 
deal with Huntington's Disease. Huntington's Disease is a horrible, untreatable, genetically-
caused disorder that develops during middle-age. Genetic tests mean that those who will develop 
it can be identified. However, many of those who know they are at risk decline the tests. If they 
                                                            
1  http://www.hearing-voices.org/ 
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are going to die horribly they would rather not know. I think that it would be rational for those 
who suspect that they might be diagnosed with certain psychiatric disorders to similarly avoid 
finding out. Most notably, there is often going to be little value in being diagnosed with a 
personality disorder – as we have seen with the case of ASPD such diagnoses can leave patients 
in a position where they are unable to tell a coherent good story about themselves. Knowledge 
isn’t always a good thing. 
 
Modesty, publicising hopeful disorder narratives, and don't ask, don't tell policies will help limit 
the harms of diagnosis, but some damage will still be done.  At the end of the day I suggest that 
whether one thinks that classifying some subdomain of mentally ill people is on balance a good 
or bad idea must depend on a weighing up of the costs and benefits. This approach is consistent 
with that which will be adopted by those drafting revisions to the DSM-V where in the case of 
revisions “potential benefits…should outweigh potential harms” (Kendler et al. 2009). It should 
be noted that as diagnoses affect not only patients, but also their relatives and friends, and 
broader society, the costs and benefits to be considered need not be limited to those affecting the 
patient. 
 
The idea that only revisions that are likely to do good should be included in the DSM has come 
in for criticism. In a recent piece in the Bulletin of the AAPP, Nassir Ghaemi argues that the 
gerrymandering of categories will set back research. He thinks that a classification should seek to 
mirror the natural structure of the domain of mental disorders, and that this will best enable 
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research that will one day lead to pragmatic benefits.  My suggestion is not that the DSM should 
lie about the nature of mental disorders, but rather that there may be conditions about which it 
should keep silent. The fundamental basis for my suggestion is that I think there may be truths 
that we are better off not knowing. This point is most easily made when one thinks of military 
research – there are facts about poisons that we do not need to find out. In so far as research in 
psychiatry can harm people there may similarly be areas where it is best not to conduct research.  
 
Unfortunately, in practice determining whether a new category will be helpful can be extremely 
difficult. Consider current debates over the possible addition of Psychosis Risk Syndrome 
(Moran 2009). Advocates argue that inclusion of the new diagnostic category will facilitate early 
treatment. Critics argue that the stigma that will be associated with the diagnosis, and the side-
effects that will result from drug treatment, outweigh any benefits. This case nicely brings out 
how very hard it is to determine whether a new category will overall do good or be harmful. 
Some of the consequences of introducing the new category are fairly predictable. Pharmaceutical 
companies would seek to market drugs for the treatment of such patients. Some employers, 
particularly those seeking recruits for high-stress jobs, would seek to avoid employing people 
with Psychosis Risk Syndrome. Other consequences of introducing a new category are hard to 
predict. What would it be like to be diagnosed with Psychosis Risk Syndrome? Would one spend 
one's time worrying about becoming psychotic?  Or would one be pleased that one's condition 




Trying to predict the effects of a new diagnostic category will always be difficult.  We can, 
however, make some generalizations. Where a condition is mild and currently untreatable, 
patients will have little to gain from it being classified. If that condition affects traits close to an 
individual’s core identity the potential for the classification to do harm may also be great.  
Prodromal Personality Disorders thus stand out as candidate disorders where classification could 
be expected to bring no net benefits for patients. 
 
Although we can get some way thinking about whether classification is a good idea on a case by 
case basis, often the relevant issues will be very difficult, and so we will find ourselves falling 
back on considerations about the benefits and harms of classification in general. For example, 
whether one will think that adding some particular new, but currently untreatable,  condition  is 
worthwhile will depend in large part on whether one thinks that research is likely to result in a 
successful treatment being developed. And, one’s judgment of the prospects of research will 
depend on whether one thinks that psychiatric research has generally managed to lead to useful 
treatments.  
 
Although I am not as optimistic as some, I tend to optimism. I think that mental disorders may 
well turn out to be repeatables, and that as a consequence the development of successful class-
based treatments (that is treatments that will be effective for all those with a particular type of 
disorder) can be hoped for. On balance, and despite the harms it causes, I think that much, 
though not all, psychiatric classification is justifiable. However I have shown how this is an issue 
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on which reasonable people can disagree. Determining when classification can be hoped to bring 
more benefits than harms is far from clear-cut. 
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